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Every two years, the American Economic Association
awards the John Bates Clark Medal to “that American
economist under the age of 40 who is adjudged to have
made the most significant contribution to economic
thought and knowledge.” Susan Athey of Harvard
University was awarded the Medal in 2007. Past 
winners include a host of economists who have gone 
on to greatly influence the profession, including Paul
Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, Robert
Solow, and Gary Becker; more recent recipients include
Paul Krugman, Kevin M. Murphy, and Andrei Shleifer.
Athey’s research is hard to sum up in a few words. 
She is perhaps best known for her methodological
work. But as she describes in the interview, many of
her methodological contributions stem from looking
at applied problems, finding the existing tools to
answer those questions, and then developing new
methods to solve them.
Her applied work has touched many fields, from the
economics of organizations, where she has looked at
how firms might improve their mentoring systems for
talented young employees, to auction design, where
she has examined how the government could more
efficiently run procurement auctions and auctions for
natural resources such as timber. She also has helped
us better understand the conditions under which 
collusion among firms might be expected and the 
possible welfare effects of such cartelization. And, of
interest to monetary economists, she has considered
why it is often desirable to limit the discretion of the
central bank so that price stability can be achieved.
Athey has long ties to the Fifth District, having grown
up in Maryland and then attending Duke University as
an undergraduate. Aaron Steelman interviewed Athey
at her office on the Harvard campus on Oct. 9, 2007.
RF: You have worked across several fields using many
different approaches to answer important questions.
Can you explain how your basic and applied work fit
together or complement each other?
Athey: What I find most exciting about economics is the
fact that real policy issues and problems always can point 
the way to interesting research questions. But I also tend to
be an abstract thinker and I like to understand the limits 
of an answer — and how particular or general that answer 
is, depending on different circumstances. That tends to take
me from a situation where I am, on the one hand, immersed
in a policy problem and trying to understand the answer, 
to where another part of my brain is trying to find 
the abstractions which that problem fits into — for 
instance, what other problems might be like this one. 
So while working on the policy paper I might have learned
something along the way that is more broadly applicable and
that might bring me to write a methodological paper 
subsequently. I haven’t tended to take a tool and apply it to
lots of different applications. I tend to have an applicationand then develop the tool. To me, it’s a natural process of 
trying to understand a problem, recognizing the short-
comings of the existing methods, and then developing new
tools to better answer similar problems.
RF: Can you give an example 
of the interplay between your
methodological work and your
work on policy problems?
Athey: Probably the best exam-
ple comes from a case where I
started working on a very applied
problem — collusion in auctions. 
To get at that problem, I devel-
oped tools for analyzing ongoing
relationships in dynamic models
with private information. That
methodological work led me to connect with macroecono-
mists who were interested in the issue of discretion in
monetary policy. I knew nothing about that issue from an
applied perspective, but I did understand a lot about provid-
ing incentives to privately informed agents. So that was an
example where I got to learn about a new applied problem
but my contribution was more on the methodological side.
So, ultimately, it came full circle — from one applied 
problem to another. And that’s a bit unusual for me. But it
can work well, because if you have different conceptual
insights, you might attack a long-standing problem in a 
different way. Plus, in this case, I got a great chance to learn
a little bit about macroeconomics.
RF: How did you become interested in the topic of 
mentoring from a research perspective?
Athey: The question of how mentoring affects diversity 
in organizations was the first problem that I posed 
independently as a scholar. I started on it in my second year
of grad school. The work was motivated by a simple 
observation. A lot of male graduate students played in 
regular basketball games with male faculty members. 
But women and nonathletic males were not particularly 
welcome. It turned out that a pretty high share of the 
students who played in these games got plum research 
assistant positions over the summer. So I started thinking
about why that was happening and what the impact was on
eventual outcomes for students, schools, and the profession.
I also thought that a lot of things I was seeing weren’t really
entering the debate about affirmative action and why firms
might want to actively manage the process of diversity. 
I developed a model that included the idea that people
might have more effective mentoring relationships with
people of the same type. The model had competing forces.
On the one hand, if people are more efficient at monitoring
people of the same type, then there could be some benefit to
having a homogenous organization. On the other hand, 
talent is scarce and so it could be that your star student or
your star young employee is of an opposite type, and if 
that is the case, you might lose out on that talent. It also
seemed that there were probably diminishing returns to 
having a huge majority of one type.
For instance, even if men were
more effective at mentoring men,
the last man you add to your faculty
might not add that much value to
mentoring the existing men. 
So we looked at these trade-offs
and how both a myopic orga-
nization might fare, as well as how 
a farsighted organization might
evolve. We derived conditions
under which there might be 
multiple steady states for a profit-
maximizing organization. If it
started out relatively homogeneous, the firm might find it
profitable to discriminate against the minority because they
will have a hard time succeeding. But if they happen to find
someone of the minority type who is so talented and such a
good fit that they do succeed, then that might make it 
worthwhile to hire more employees of the minority type 
and move toward a diverse steady state. At that point, the 
organization might implement a voluntary and profit-
maximizing affirmative action program as an investment in
the ability to mentor future minorities. One of the key
assumptions in such a model is that there is a scarcity of 
talent for people who match an organization’s needs. To find
that talent, firms might have to look for people who by some 
characteristics do not tend to fit the profile of their existing
workers. Initially, that can cause some problems but 
ultimately be beneficial to the firm. So you might take some
short-term hit in profits but over the long-run it can be a
good investment. 
This goes beyond my model, but I think it’s important 
to note that social conventions are often arbitrary. For
instance, a Southern law firm might have a hunting trip for
its annual retreat. But young associates, and perhaps 
especially young female associates, might have no interest in
hunting. So if they changed the retreat to something that was
more gender-neutral, in a couple of years, only a few of the
long-standing partners might care and you would appeal to a
broader pool of talent. So that’s outside of my model, but my
model does have these trade-offs in diversity, where you are
not as effective at mentoring majorities of either type when
you are diverse. In the long run, though, my belief is that 
people get better mentoring those from another type as
social norms change and they get a little experience doing it. 
RF: How did you get interested in auction design?
Athey:  When I was heading off to college I needed a 
summer job, so I worked as a receptionist for a company that
sold computers to the government at auction. My family also
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I haven’t tended to take 
a tool and apply it to lots 
of different applications. 
I tend to have an 
application and then 
develop the tool.sells timber and cattle at auction. So I had some exposure
already, but it was while working at that summer job that 
I recognized that the way the government ran its 
procurement auctions led to some inefficient behavior. 
One of my friends introduced me to Bob Marshall, a profes-
sor at Duke who was working on defense procurement. I
shared with him what I had
observed, because while I knew that
the procurement process could be
improved, I did not know how to put
this issue into formal models or how
to conceptualize what was happen-
ing. I wrote a paper about the topic
that gathered a lot of the institution-
al information and with his guidance
put it into an economic framework. 
I was fascinated by observing
Bob’s work on theory models that
seemed to hit the nail on the head:
They were right, insightful, and I
learned something that I hadn’t
known before. As a result of this
research, he was asked to testify
before Congress about changes in
the procurement system. A lot had
happened in the few years since I
took that summer job as a reception-
ist. Senators were listening to the
suggestions we had to reform to the
process and that was very gratifying. 
RF: What were some of the flaws in the bidding process
that you observed?
Athey:With auctions, the problems are often not just in the
design of the auction itself. You have to design a market, and
there are a whole set of rules in a market — for instance, who
can participate, what gets sold, and how it is divided to be
sold. So the design decisions of a market are much broader
than the auction itself. In this particular context, there was
no problem with the auction; there was a problem with the
regulatory environment. The government had created a very
streamlined process for protesting a procurement. If a bid-
der thought that a procurement had been misallocated —
perhaps a procurement official had been biased or there was
some error in the process — the costs to appeal were very
low and the procurement would immediately be delayed for
45 days while a board reviewed the protest.  This seemed like
a good idea, but what they hadn’t taken into account was
that many of the smaller procurements had very short deliv-
ery dates, and you had to immediately start delivering on the
procurement when it was awarded. So a small business might
have brought in a couple of million dollars worth of inven-
tory, and then 20 days into the procurement, the award would
be protested, at which point everything would be frozen 
with the company sitting on this relatively large amount
of inventory for 45 days with an uncertain resolution 
to the protest. 
This could potentially pose some serious problems for
the company with the winning bid, which everyone knew. 
So the protesting bidder would often approach the awardee
and ask for a settlement. This type of side payment 
was encouraged by procurement
officials because they just wanted
their computers and from their 
perspective, the faster a protest 
was resolved, the better. A few 
companies came into existence 
that were not legitimate — they 
saw how the protest system was 
handled and made money 
just by asking for bribes, in effect,
from legitimate companies that 
had been awarded procurement
contracts. These protesting compa-
nies could have never fulfilled the
contracts themselves. 
So it was a very inefficient system
where companies were regularly
being held up and pressured into
side payments. We saw that we
could develop a model which could 
capture what was going on and 
guide policies for improving incen-
tives while preserving the original
intention of the protest system. 
The tools of economics allowed us to develop a formal 
analysis of the issue. That was what really got me interested
in auctions. The theme that emerged from this case runs
through a lot of my applied work. In the end, yes, 
the auction rules are important but you also have to get 
the broader context correct.
RF: Can you discuss your work on timber auctions?
What did the U.S. Forest Service do incorrectly that the
Canadian government seemed to improve upon?
Athey: My papers are not directly about that second 
question, but I think they can help shed some light on it.
The U.S. Forest Service doesn’t raise revenue, generally.
That’s a problem. But that’s not a problem of auction design.
It’s a problem of market design and incentives facing the
agency. Because the Forest Service has not been run with the
goal of revenue maximization, lots of tracts get sold that do
not generate much revenue for the government. In many
cases, the government would reimburse the firms for road
construction and essentially the value of the timber was not
much more than the cost of building the roads. There also
have  been a lot of issues of regulatory capture. 
In Canada, timber is such an important natural resource
that the government cannot afford to essentially subsidize
the timber industry in this way. The government needs the
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program, so it does operate a revenue-generating enterprise.
The Canadian problem is that the government owns a very
large fraction of the resource. So they have worked hard to
design a system that could deliver the best possible 
incentives for efficient behavior, such as getting the right
trees cut at the right time, getting the right timber replanted,
and getting the right mills built, as well as bringing in 
revenue for the government.
To illustrate the issues that have to be solved regarding
market design, nobody is going to build a mill if they 
don’t have some idea of future supply. So the Canadian 
government engaged in various forms of long-term 
contracting, which is a very sensible thing to do. But once
you have the mills built, you have to find a way to price the 
timber that is going to those mills. Historically, they used
various forms of administered prices. The United States
complained about that. So British Columbia introduced a
system where they used auctions to create spot markets 
for timber, and the prices on that spot market were 
used to calibrate prices for timber harvested under 
long-term contracts. 
RF: In which industries — or types of industries — is
collusion most common? And how can policymakers
respond to such noncompetitive behavior to improve
the functioning of those markets? 
Athey: Collusion often occurs in markets where you tend to
have homogeneous products, fairly inelastic demand, and
high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Examples include the
lysine and vitamin industries. There is a small number of
firms that have made big investments in plants. They need a
markup to survive and they are continually bidding on 
business from big customers. 
There have been some firms that have been in a number
of markets where collusion might be desirable and they got
very good at colluding. For instance, Archer Daniels Midland
(ADM) was in both the lysine and vitamin markets and they
helped to organize fairly effective cartels. In those kinds of
environments, you expect strong pressure for those firms to
find some way to soften up their price competition because
the underlying conditions of the marketplace are so severe.
It is common in procurement to have a fairly small 
number of firms consistently bidding against one another.
So we have seen it in school milk and road construction. 
And some things that the government does can actually
make it easier for firms to collude. In order to maintain
transparency, the government tends to reveal a lot of 
information about procurement and also tends to break
things up into smaller procurements, creating lots of 
auctions. That creates the conditions where firms can more
easily arrive at tacit collusion. 
The auction design can make a difference. For instance,
it’s much easier to collude in an open-bid auction than in a
sealed-bid auction. That’s something my empirical research
confirms. In my work, open auctions do not yield as much
revenue as you would expect, and that is consistent with 
the theory that collusion is easier in that environment. 
It’s certainly possible to collude in sealed-bid auctions. 
But it’s especially easy to collude in open auctions, because
there really isn’t much gain from deviating today. To see why,
imagine that a bunch of bidders have all agreed to bid low in
an auction and then you show up and you deviate. As soon as
you start bidding above the agreed price, your competitors
can respond. They can outbid you. In a sealed-bid auction,
however, a firm can deviate and their competitors cannot
immediately respond. They can only respond in the future. 
In an open auction, if you are not the most efficient firm,
you cannot gain at all by deviating to win the auction. If you
are the most efficient firm but you were not designated by
the cartel to win, then you can gain in the present day 
by deviating. But you might not gain that much, because
your opponents can bid you up. At best, you can gain 
the competitive profit today while in a sealed-bid auction
you can gain the collusive profit today.   
RF: In your opinion, how effective is antitrust policy 
in preventing collusion?
Athey: Typically, tacit collusion, where firms do not 
make formal agreements, tends not to get prosecuted. The
prosecutions that take place typically occur because firms
have gotten together and done something explicitly illegal —
like fixed a bid or met in a smoke-filled room and exchanged
side payments. My research addresses the following 
questions: If that’s the main way firms get caught, why do
they take that risk? Why can’t they do pretty well with tacit
collusion? My research suggests that bribes and communica-
tion can be helpful for firms in achieving the most efficient
cartel. So, in principle, if they are very patient and sophisti-
cated, they may be able to arrive at a scheme of tacit collusion
that does allocate efficiently. But if firms are less patient, they
may not get there. Bribes can help them settle up today to 
compensate those who give up market share. So if one firm is
more efficient than the others or has extra inventory, it can
pay the other firms to hold back production. If you do not
have transfers to do that, you just have to make some 
promise that in the future you will take a turn and let the
other firms produce. But that’s a long way off, it’s not clear
that people will follow up on the promise, and things become
murky without the side payments.
Tacit collusion also becomes easier when there are many
rounds of bidding. If you give firms a lot of opportunity to
interact and if any particular action they might take does not
have a huge impact on final outcomes, then firms are able 
to communicate through the marketplace and don’t neces-
sarily need to get together to talk. For example, in Federal
Communications Commission auctions, Firm B may bid
against Firm A in some city that Firm B does not have a 
natural interest in to signal to Firm A to stay out of those
areas that Firm B considers to be its core markets. If it’s early
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in the process, those prices are not going to be the final
prices. So the firms are able to communicate in the early
stages of the price discovery process and divide up the 
markets to decide how the licenses are allocated. Firms can
use other techniques, such as putting signals in the trailing
digits of their bids. Instead of bidding a round number, they
would use patterns of numbers to communicate with each
other. But if you have less frequent, larger auctions where
there are not a lot of opportunities to communicate through
action, firms tend to need to 
get together and explicitly com-
municate to arrive at a similar
arrangement.  
RF: I would like to return to
your research on discretion 
in monetary policy. Can you dis-
cuss your work on inflation
targeting — about the possible
virtues of and problems with
limiting central bank autonomy?
Athey:  You might ask: Why does the central bank need 
discretion at all? Why can’t we make rules that depend on
publicly available information? You can think of different
motivations for having central bank autonomy. A leading
motivation must be that you believe the central bank under-
stands something that is difficult to quantify or write down as
a function of public observables. It’s not that the central bank
has access to better raw information, but perhaps there is a
lot of subjectivity in evaluating publicly available data and
because of that, reasonable experts would arrive at different
conclusions based on the same data. If the central bank has
some expertise in analyzing those data — and if it has access
to some nonpublic data, which it does — then there can be an
argument for discretion. The problem is they also have a 
classic time inconsistency problem. There can be a benefit to
a surprise inflation. So the question becomes, how do you
provide incentives in a world where the agency you are trying
to incentivize has a social objective at heart, but they have
private information and a time inconsistency problem?
The fundamental economic insight is that in an environ-
ment like that, where the mechanisms you have for
providing incentives have social costs, it is often not worth
the cost to provide incentives. If the central bank decides it
is optimal to increase inflation a little bit today, inflation
expectations may go up in the future. How do you weigh 
the future costs with today’s benefits? The answer is not 
self-evident. In fact, it depends on the nature and distribu-
tion of the private information. But for a wide set of
circumstances, it is not worth it to try to provide incentives.
It is desirable, much more often than you might expect, to
simply establish an inflation cap and limit autonomy. 
The reasons for that are fairly subtle. But that same kind of
idea has also arisen in my work on collusion. 
In some circumstances, firms collude best by just setting a
fixed price and sharing the market evenly rather than attempt-
ing to divide up the market in an efficient way. 
You need pretty efficient instruments for providing incentives
to make it worthwhile to provide those incentives. When
resolving the trade-off  between suboptimal decisions and
inefficient instruments for incentives, you have to account for
the indirect effects of the decision policy, because you will
have to distort what happens in some states of the world 
to preserve incentives to make the best decisions in other
states of the world. Those indirect
spillovers wind up pushing you
toward less efficient decisions. 
RF: What would you consider
your most important contribu-
tion to econometrics or method-
ology more generally?
Athey:  I would not say that my
most important methodological
contribution is in econometrics. I
think that I, among other people,
have influenced applied practice in industrial organization
and the analysis of auction data by paying a lot of attention to
non-parametric identification. I have been able to push the
ball forward in delineating what kinds of auction environ-
ments you could possibly learn the primitives of models and
in which kinds of environments that is just not possible. I
think that is an important set of facts to know when you go
to start a project. 
I also have emphasized specification testing to provide
more systematic ways to justify assumptions that you make.
Rather than just marching forward with a set of assumptions
for a structural model, I have emphasized ways to test those
assumptions and have more confidence in your work. I hope
that I have focused more attention at the beginning steps of
a project, when you are conceptualizing which question you
can ask and what assumptions you should make. 
Let’s assume that you have a very large and good data set,
there is a lot of value in determining early on whether you
can answer your question with a minimum of extraneous
simplifying assumptions. Could I answer the question just
using the assumptions that I believe to be good approxima-
tions for reality or that are testable, rather than relying on
assumptions of functional form or unrealistic assumptions
about the environment? I hope that by doing that early
work, people will abandon projects to which the answer is no
or focus their attention on what additional piece of data
would turn the answer from no to yes. For example, if you
want to do structural work on common-value auctions, you
are going to need some data beyond bidding data, such as
information about the underlying value of the object
obtained from observations after the auction ends (e.g. how
much oil was extracted from an oil lease). So before you even
begin a project, you should find that kind of data, otherwise
the project will not be fruitful.
Economics allows you 
to think several layers
deeper. Without that
structure, you just get 
lost in a muddle.RF: I read on your Web site a short article that you
wrote for middle-school students about applying math
to real-world problems. How do you think economists
can help students become more interested in economics
and not necessarily scared off by the sometimes very
technical nature of the discipline?
Athey:  I think a big issue is finding the problems that 
will engage students and showing them that economics can 
provide real insights. One thing that has made it easier 
for me to engage undergraduate students is eBay. It is 
still a relatively new company; someone not much older than
the students founded it; they can see how it allows 
them to buy something they otherwise might not be able to
get; and they are forced to think a little bit about bidding
strategy and market design when they interact with the 
system. It allows them to think about which kind of 
economic institutions you might like and which might be
more appropriate for certain goods. There are many things
on eBay that might initially seem puzzling but that conform
quite well to economic theory. So through this example you
can get students engaged and improve their understanding of
something they have already encountered and puzzled over.
That is quite powerful.
I think another example is the economics of social 
networking sites like facebook.com and myspace.com.
These are also institutions they interact with, yet the design
decisions are evolving and the dominant market structure
has not yet been determined. They can see how market
design matters. 
There are other broad topical areas that can get students
engaged, such as the economics of sports or the economics
of the entertainment industry. Finding the applications that
resonate with the students or the population in general and
then showing them how a little bit of structured thinking
can substantially improve their understanding — I think
that’s where you get the power of economics. I’m still
amazed that in the business world how having a coherent
and structured way of approaching problems can allow
someone like me to walk into an industry meeting and talk
to people who are brilliant people managing large companies
and still have unique insights for them. That’s because I have
these really powerful tools at my disposal. Economics allows
you to think several layers deeper. Without that structure,
you just get lost in a muddle.
RF: You are the co-editor of the American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, one of four new journals
launched by the American Economic Association. What
niche do you aim to fill that is not currently served by the
many and varied academic journals already in existence? 
Athey: There are a lot of journals, but there are not a lot of
really good journals. Most of them are fairly secure in their
position. So there is not a lot of competition on service. An
enormous amount of time is wasted with slow refereeing
processes and revisions that may improve the paper but are
not worth the time required to make them. So a big goal for
me is to have an outlet for the kind of work that I like, where
people can get good service in a general-interest outlet. 
A secondary issue is that for more technical work there are
not that many options from a general-interest perspective. 
Your papers fall to the field journals very quickly. Basically,
what I want is a journal that gets the cost-benefit analysis on
revisions right, that turns around papers fast, and that 
reaches a broad audience with technically rigorous work.   
RF: How has winning the John Bates Clark Medal
affected your life, both personally and professionally? 
Athey: Receiving an honor like the Clark Medal puts me in
the position of being an ambassador for economics to the
general public. Given how passionate I am about economics,
I view that as an exciting opportunity. Also, when you win
the Clark Medal, you get a lot of media attention — and 
with that, a lot of correspondence from people you may
know only slightly or not at all. As the first female winner, 
I received hundreds of e-mails from women in other 
male-dominated professions. These people felt compelled to
tell their own stories and it made me realize the power of
being a role model. Whether you like it or not, graduate 
students are looking ahead at the people who are leading the
profession and it appears to have affected a substantial 
number of them to look at me. That’s not something that I
chose — or even can control — but it has happened, and it
has been gratifying to know that I may have inspired more
women to jump into mathematically oriented professions
such as economics. RF
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